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Real world procurement transactions often involve multiple attributes and multiple vendors. Successful 
procurement involves vendor selection through appropriate market mechanisms. The advancement of 
information technologies has enabled different mechanisms to be applied to similar procurement situations. 
Advantages and disadvantages of using such mechanisms remain unclear. The presented research compares 
two types of mechanisms: multi-attribute reverse auctions and multi-attribute multi-bilateral negotiations 
in e-procurement. Both laboratory and online experiments were carried out to examine their effects on the 
process, outcomes and suppliers’ assessment. The results show that in procurement, reverse auctions were 
more efficient than negotiations in terms of the process. Auctions also led to greater gains for the buyers 
than negotiations but the suppliers’ profit was lower in auctions. The buyer and the winning supplier jointly 
reached more efficient and balanced contracts in negotiations than in auctions. The results also show that 
the suppliers’ assessment was affected by their outcomes: the winning suppliers had a more positive 
assessment towards the process, outcomes and the system. The findings are consistent in both the laboratory 
and online settings. The implications of this study for practitioners and researchers are discussed. 
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E-procurement is a key component in business-to-business (B2B) commerce, through which 
organizations obtain goods and services. Successful procurement depends on the selection of the right goods 
and services as well as the choice of the best method to buy them (Handfield and Straight 2003).  
Typical methods in B2B transactions include reverse auctions and negotiations. Most auctions deal 
with single attribute goods or services—typically price. However, organizations are also often interested in 
values of attributes other than the price (Ferrin and Plank 2002). These types of decisions have been usually 
made through negotiations. E-procurement allows buyers to search for suppliers worldwide and online 
creating the need for more advanced mechanisms than either single-attribute auctions or bilateral 
negotiations. 
Several multi-attribute reverse auction mechanisms have been recently proposed (for review see 
Pham, Teich et al. 2015). Some aim at combining price with the total costs of all non-price attributes, others 
at aggregating all attributes into utility functions. Most of these mechanisms require that buyers be willing 
to disclose their preferences, which they rarely do in real life (Burmeister, Ihde et al. 2002; Parkes and 
Kalagnanam 2005). 
In business negotiations, it is typical to seek agreements on price as well as on other attributes. 
Buyers may negotiate with different suppliers over the same goods (sequentially or simultaneously) in order 
to increase their bargaining power and realize a surplus (Stenbacka and Tombak 2012). Sequential bilateral 
negotiations with one supplier at a time or several suppliers simultaneously over multiple attributes are both 
complex and inefficient, when compared to simultaneous negotiations. The buyer’s simultaneous 
negotiations with multiple suppliers, i.e., multi-bilateral negotiations, may not be possible or may require 
the engagement of several procurement managers. Information technologies can support multi-bilateral 
negotiations; few studies, however, have modeled and examined them. One aim of this study is to show 
how such negotiations can be conducted online and become an alternative mechanism to online auctions. 
Organizations need to select and possibly adapt market mechanisms to suit their particular 
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procurement situation. Models and guidelines have been proposed to aid the mechanism selection in 
procurement practice (e.g. Kraljic 1983; Handfield and Straight 2003; Gelderman and Van Weele 2005). 
Based on the supply market complexity and the importance of procurement, four types of procurement 
transactions have been suggested: bottleneck, strategic, noncritical and leverage. In many situations, the 
same type of transactions may be performed with different mechanisms. For instance, both reverse auctions 
and negotiations have been suggested for the “leverage” transactions (Kaufmann and Carter 2004; 
Subramanian and Zeckhauser 2004; Bajari, McMillan et al. 2009). These guidelines consider general 
sourcing strategies rather than the detailed parameters describing the marketplace and organization with its 
procurement process. Experimental economics and market design (Milgrom 2000; Smith 2003) empirically 
study mechanisms with different design characteristics, resulting in a dearth of comparisons of multi-
attribute auction mechanisms (Kagel and Levin 2012). 
The present research adds to the literature with empirical examination and comparison of multi-
attribute auctions and multi-attribute multi-bilateral negotiations for same e-procurement tasks. The results 
should help researchers and practitioners to gain better understanding of the differences between 
procurement mechanisms, their use and the outcomes which they produce. To this end, two systems were 
developed in which comparable auctions and negotiations were implemented, and two experiments were 
carried out to validate the research and the results in laboratory and online settings. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the background and motivation 
for this research, and in particular, comparative studies on multi-attribute auctions and e-negotiations. 
Section 3 formulates the research model and hypotheses aimed at comparing auctions and negotiations. 
Section 4 describes the experiments. Section 5 presents data analysis and results. Section 6 discusses the 
findings and their implications for practice and future research. 
 
2. Background and motivation 
Reverse auctions and online negotiations have been used in e-procurement (Bichler and Steinberg 
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2007; Bajari, McMillan et al. 2009; Pham, Teich et al. 2015). To provide the background and motivation 
for our study, this section reviews literature in which these two mechanisms and their effects have been 
discussed. 
2.1 Multi-attribute auctions and e-negotiations 
Multi-attribute auctions are designed to deal with transaction problems that involve multiple parties 
and multiple attributes. There are two concerns when designing and using multi-attribute auctions: (1) the 
representation of the buyer’s preferences that allow the sellers to compare bids from the buyer’s perspective; 
and (2) the specification of rules for information revelation during the auction. 
Several multi-attribute auction mechanisms have been designed using scoring methods to represent 
the buyer’s preferences (e.g. Bichler, Field et al. 2001; Beil and Wein 2003; Engel and Wellman 2010). One 
typical method is the attribute monetization method (Parkes and Kalagnanam 2005); it expresses non-price 
attributes in monetary terms. The method is limited to auctions with homogenous bidders and monotonic 
attributes and it assumes that price and the monetized attributes (e.g., costs) are independent and the buyers 
and sellers are risk neutral (Ausubel and Milgrom 2006; Kersten 2014). 
Another concern in multi-attribute auctions pertains to information that is revealed to the bidders. 
It requires that the information be sufficient for the bidders so that they can make progressive bids. The 
revealed information may be directly or indirectly related to the buyer’s preferences in one or in a 
combination of the following three forms: buyer’s preferences, bids and constraints (Koppius and Heck 
2003; Chen-Ritzo, Harrison et al. 2005; Strecker 2010; Adomavicius, Gupta et al. 2012). The efficacy and 
the impact of these rules were experimentally studied, and showed that information revelation affects 
bidders’ strategies, market competition, and transactional outcomes. 
Most auction mechanisms require the disclosure of the buyer’s preferences so that sufficient 
information is provided to bidders enabling them to make progressive bids. The disclosure of preferences, 
however, is problematic when the buying organization views these preferences as secret; disclosing them 
may endanger their competitive position (Burmeister, Ihde et al. 2002; Parkes and Kalagnanam 2005). A 
novel auction procedure has been designed and implemented. The procedure allows for the separation of 
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preference representation and information revelation as well as the control of disclosure (Kersten and Wu 
2015). 
With the advanced development of the Internet technologies, negotiations can now be conducted 
online. They are conducted via e-negotiation systems (ENSs), which support, facilitate and mediate 
negotiations (for review see Kersten and Lai 2008). A number of ENSs have been developed, in which 
different models and rules are implemented to provide various forms of support. 
E-negotiation studies have examined the influential factors in users’ perceptions of ENSs. Vetschera 
et al. (2006) presented an integrated model to analyze factors that affect users’ assessment of systems and 
their intention to use these systems. Exploratory studies of the e-negotiation participants’ activities have 
shown difference in their objectives and orientations (Wu, Kersten et al. 2012). Some participants are 
predominantly concerned with the substantive objectives that focus on transactional and economic 
outcomes while others are interested in relational objectives.  
2.3 Comparison of auctions and negotiations 
Formal comparisons of market mechanisms have been of interest to economists. The underlying 
assumption is that the market participants are rational and self-interested. Manelli (1995) observed that the 
mechanism’s results depend on the market situation. The comparison becomes even more difficult when 
the underlying assumptions of the mechanisms significantly differ from each other, as it is the case with 
auctions and negotiations. Auctions assume that bidders have some knowledge of buyer’s valuation of the 
goods and follow a strict and fixed procedure. Negotiations have significantly weaker assumptions; the 
often-made assumption is that the parties negotiate in good faith and that they are able to assess and compare 
the alternatives. There are no limitations to communication and no assumptions about the sellers’ 
knowledge of the buyer’s valuation. 
Behavioral economics examines and compares different mechanisms (Roth 2002; Smith 2003). 
One of the purposes is to validate theoretical predications with empirical results. This requires that the 
rationality paradigm be extended and social-psychological variables included (Maskin 2007). Majority of 
studies focused on the comparison of different auction mechanisms, whereas only a few studies compared 
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auctions and negotiations (Thomas and Wilson 2002; Thomas and Wilson 2005; Gerke and Stiller 2006; 
Gattiker, Huang et al. 2007). The studies that compared these mechanisms are summarized in Table 1. 
 
[Table 1. Empirical studies comparing auctions and negotiations] 
 
The differences identified in these studies may be summarized in the following six points:  
(1) The number of attributes is fixed and usually small in auctions; the number of attributes in 
negotiations is open and often larger than in auctions;  
(2) The relationship between the buyer and the sellers is very restricted in auctions, but it is very 
significant in negotiations and involves interpersonal interactions;  
(3) The communication follows a fixed format, it is highly structured and unidirectional (i.e., between 
the sellers) in auctions, but it is open, fluid and bi-directional in negotiations; 
(4) The visibility among suppliers and the process and information transparency are higher in auctions 
than in negotiations; this increases the level of competition in auctions;  
(5) The length of the process is typically longer in negotiations than in auctions;  
(6) The cognitive complexity in simple, price-only and two-attribute auctions as well as multi-attribute 
auctions, in which the buyer’s preferences are fully revealed, is much lower than in negotiations. 
However, the complexity drastically increases in multi-attribute auctions with hidden preferences.  
2.4 Motivation and objectives 
Empirical validation of the differences in auctions and negotiations and their effects can guide the 
practice and lead to effective procurement. It has been noted that auctions outperform negotiations in terms 
of economic gains from the buyer’s perspective (e.g. Bulow and Klemperer 1996; Gerke and Stiller 2006). 
However, studies have also shown that negotiations outperform auctions (e.g. Leffler, Rucker et al. 2006; 
Bajari, McMillan et al. 2009).  
The findings of auctions and negotiations comparisons are inconclusive.  The comparative studies 
were either conducted in different settings or for different tasks (e.g. Kugler, Neeman et al. 2006; Fluck, 
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John et al. 2007). This study attempts to address the problem/weakness by focusing on two issues: (1) which 
mechanism outperforms the other in the same context, and (2) what conditions cause one mechanism to 
outperform the other. 
Comparative studies on auctions and negotiations focus on a single-attribute (i.e., price-only). With 
the exception of studies by Thomas and Wilson (2002; 2005), only bilateral negotiations were compared 
with auctions, which removes the element of competition among sellers in negotiations but not in auctions. 
Also, their focus on theoretical verification led to the comparison of abstract models or models embedded 
in a rudimentary system (Thomas and Wilson 2002; Thomas and Wilson 2005). Several empirical studies 
compared auctions and negotiations that were implemented with richer features but in different systems 
(Kaufmann and Carter 2004; Gattiker, Huang et al. 2007). The results could be confounded because of the 
effects of user interface and system features, which could not be controlled.  
The above discussion indicates a need for experimental comparison of multi-attribute auctions and 
multi-bilateral negotiations in a similar setting (e.g. task, implementation) so that the differences between 
them can be better understood. In order to study the differences two types of mechanisms have been 
designed and implemented (Wu, Kersten et al. 2014): a multi-attribute reverse auction and a multi-attribute 
multi-bilateral negotiation. Both can be used in e-procurement involving multiple parties and multiple 
attributes. The revelation and exchange of information in these mechanisms is based on attribute values 
instead of utility values, and thus there is no need to explicitly disclose the buyer’s preferences. Moreover, 
as these mechanisms are implemented with similar user interface in the same platform, it is possible to 
employ the capabilities of information technologies but also to separate the effects of user interface and 
system features.  
 
3. Research model and hypotheses  
This study compares auctions and negotiations by examining their effects on the transaction process 
and outcomes. In addition, the subjective evaluation is also considered based on the participants’ assessment. 
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The conceptual model is presented in Figure 1. 
 
[Figure 1. Research model] 
 
3.1 Variables and measurement 
This study focuses on two different mechanisms with information revelation and exchange during 
the procurement process: 
Auction: Multi-attribute reverse auction in which the buyer reveals the admissible bids and the 
current winning bid; 
Negotiation: Multi-attribute multi-bilateral negotiation in which the buyer exchanges offers and 
messages with each supplier. 
The two mechanisms are implemented in Imaras and Imbins respectively (Wu, Kersten et al. 2014). 
In both mechanisms, the suppliers have full access to their own bids or offers/messages throughout the 
process. The two mechanisms differ in terms of the types of information conveyed from the buyer to the 
suppliers.  
In the Imaras auctions, the buyer is not involved in the transaction process; rather, the buyer defines 
the rules prior to the auction and the mechanism then follows the rules to evaluate the suppliers’ bids, 
identify the winning bid, state the admissible bids, and finally announce the winner. The feedback 
information about the admissible bids and the bid status (wining or not) is provided to the suppliers via the 
Imaras system (Figure 2). Such information is public and credible, i.e. all the suppliers receive the same 
information at the same time, based on which they can make appropriate decisions. 
 
[Figure 2. Screen of “Bids & Limits” after several rounds in Imaras] 
 
In the Imbins negotiations, the buyer may disclose any constraints on all suppliers’ subsequent 
offers (equivalent to admissible bids in the auctions) and any existing offers from the suppliers (e.g. the 
current outstanding offer and/or non-preferable offers) (Figure 3). While the buyer may not disclose the 
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offers submitted by all suppliers, she may want to provide clues to the suppliers so that they can make better 
offers for her, and explicitly or implicitly refer to the outstanding offer to increase the bargaining power. 
This makes the negotiations similar to auctions. However, such information is private and non-verifiable. 
The suppliers can communicate only with the buyer and have to rely on the information they obtain from 
the buyer. The suppliers cannot fully trust this information and the buyers do not necessarily disclose the 
current best offer—even if they mention that they have a better offer, the suppliers may view it as a tactic. 
 
[Figure 3. Screen of “Offers & messages” for the supplier in Imbins] 
 
Both economic and subjective measures are used to examine and compare the two mechanisms. 
Economic indicators have been used to measure individual and market performance (behavioral economics) 
(Roth 1995; Smith 2003). Appendix A lists the behavioral and economic measures from prior studies on 
auctions and negotiations (incl. Bichler 2000; Koppius and Heck 2003; Chen-Ritzo, Harrison et al. 2005; 
Gerke and Stiller 2006; Vetschera, Kersten et al. 2006; Jap and Haruvy 2008; Whitford, Bottom et al. 2011). 
This study takes into account realistic situations in e-procurement and thus does not rely on quasi-linearity 
and risk-neutrality assumptions. The study follows the decision and negotiation analysis approach to assess 
the quality of contracts based on allocative efficiency, Pareto optimality, joint gains and outcome equity.  
The transaction process can be analyzed using the number of bids/offers, the amount of concessions 
and the convergence speed, which together indicate the process efficiency (Table A-1 in Appendix A). 
Because the buyer is not directly involved in auctions, the number of bids/offers and concessions are 
concerned with the suppliers only. The convergence speed is considered at the transactional level.  
The outcomes are measured using potential profit from a contract, which is the difference between 
the company’s revenue from the contract and its break-even point (Table A-2 in Appendix A). This was 
implemented in the case used in the experiment so that a realistic situation where the participants perform 
a role-play in the experiments could be established; instead of directly using utilities, the notions of revenue, 
cost and profit help enhance the realistic context.  
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Mechanisms used for online exchanges must be implemented in systems. The users’ assessment of 
a mechanism is also their assessment of the system. The users’ perception of the process and outcomes may 
affect their assessment of the mechanisms. Satisfaction has been a surrogate of the effectiveness of 
information systems and has been used in the acceptance and assessment of various types of systems, 
including e-markets and e-negotiation systems (Oörni 2003; Wang, Lim et al. 2010). A multi-dimensional 
scale of participants’ assessment in e-markets which was developed and adapted for the study of auctions 
(Wu and Kersten 2013) is used to measure the suppliers’ assessment.  
3.2 Hypotheses 
Formal and empirical studies on mechanism comparisons have shown that the performance of 
different mechanisms may vary in terms of process efficiency and outcomes (Koppius and Heck 2003; 
Kaufmann and Carter 2004; Thomas and Wilson 2005; Gerke and Stiller 2006; Mithas and Jones 2007).  
Auctions provide the same feedback information to all the suppliers, whereas in negotiations the 
feedback is private with both structured offers and unstructured messages. The feedback information about 
bids in auctions can be used by the suppliers to discover the buyer’s preferences, which can lead to better 
performance in requesting and receiving bids and thus to converge faster towards an agreement (Koppius 
and Heck 2003; Thomas and Wilson 2005; Strecker 2010). In negotiations, buyers often customize and 
exchange private information with suppliers which requires longer time and more effort (Kaufmann and 
Carter 2004; Subramanian 2009). Public information provided in auctions also indicates the existence and 
participation of other suppliers, which increases the competition and thus requires that the suppliers make 
larger concessions in their bids (Jap and Haruvy 2008; Granados, Gupta et al. 2010; Kersten, Vahidov et al. 
2013). It should be noted that the concessions made by the bidders may also depend on their reservation 
levels based on the supplier’s profile (e.g. resource, competency). The comparisons are based on average 
concessions made by the suppliers who use the same mechanisms. Thus, we expect that:  
H1  Suppliers will make a greater number of bids in auctions than in negotiations. 
H2 Suppliers will make larger concessions in auctions than in negotiations. 
H3 In auctions the buyer and the suppliers will converge in a shorter time than in negotiations. 
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Auctions have been found to increase the buyer’s economic gains more than negotiations (Thomas 
and Wilson 2002; Kaufmann and Carter 2004; Bajari, McMillan et al. 2009). This is partially due to the 
higher competition among suppliers in auctions. Auctions reveal information about winning bids from other 
suppliers, and thus the suppliers know that they are competing with others. This can be completely 
concealed in negotiations, in situations when the buyer does not announce any information about other 
suppliers and/or outstanding offers. Studies on information transparency have also found that the 
availability of offers from different suppliers increases market competition and thus leads to cost savings 
for buyers (Soh, Markus et al. 2006; Granados, Gupta et al. 2008; Granados, Gupta et al. 2010).  
Experimental studies on auctions have shown mixed results regarding supplier’s outcomes, 
particularly in multi-attribute transactions (Bichler 2000; Koppius and Heck 2003; Chen-Ritzo, Harrison et 
al. 2005). In negotiations, a lower level of competition may lead to smaller concessions from the suppliers 
and thus improve their gains (Kersten, Vahidov et al. 2013). In addition, the buyer can also make offers and 
counter-offers in negotiations, which often entails reciprocity and obligations and thus decreases their gains 
(Esser and Komorita 1975). It should also be noted that profit is measured based on the contract reached 
between the buyer and one of the suppliers (i.e. the winning supplier). Since the value and the cost functions 
vary across suppliers. Larger concessions may not always lead to lower profit and the profit may also be 
different for different winning suppliers. Hence, we expect that: 
H4 The buyer’s profit will be higher in auctions than in negotiations. 
H5 The supplier’s profit will be lower in auctions than in negotiations. 
Taking into account both the buyer’s and the suppliers’ side, four indicators are used to measure 
their joint performance and the contract quality: allocative efficiency, Pareto optimality, joint gains and 
outcome equity. Revealing the buyer’s preferences and other valuable information, such as winning bids, 
helps the suppliers make trade-offs between different attributes and seek joint improvements (Koppius and 
Heck 2003; Chen-Ritzo, Harrison et al. 2005; Strecker 2010). An earlier study showed that more balanced 
contracts were reached when more information was revealed in multi-attribute reverse auctions (Wu and 
Kersten 2013). In negotiations, additional information exchanged during the process may help negotiators 
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gain more knowledge about each other and thus achieve better joint outcomes (Vetschera, Kersten et al. 
2006). Also, while auctions may focus on economic goals (i.e. the buyer will achieve the best possible 
contract), negotiations as social-economic process also involve relational concerns (Wu, Kersten et al. 
2012). When both sides consider each other and make reciprocal offers, they may be able to reach a more 
balanced contract. Thus, we also expect that: 
H6 Auctions will outperform negotiations in terms of allocative efficiency and Pareto optimality. 
H7 Negotiations will outperform auctions in terms of joint gains and outcome equity. 
Moreover, additional information revealed by the buyer may also increase the transparency of the 
process along with, consequently, the trust of the suppliers and a better relationship (Gattiker, Huang et al. 
2007; Lösch and Lambert 2007). Reciprocity can be a vehicle for conveying sentiments and developing 
relationship in social exchange (Molm, Schaefer et al. 2007). Buyers in negotiations may make reciprocal 
offers and counter-offers, which increase the suppliers’ actual gains and thus improve their feelings and the 
assessment of the process and outcomes. Suppliers in e-procurement are also users of such systems, and the 
evaluation of systems is often affected by their performance and outcomes (Venkatesh, Morris et al. 2003; 
Vetschera, Kersten et al. 2006). Hence, we expect that: 
H8  Negotiations will lead to more positive assessment of: (1) the process, (2) the outcomes and 
(3) the system, than auctions. 
 
4. Experiments and data collection 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the different mechanisms in terms of their impact on the 
procurement process and outcomes. The two systems (Imaras and Imbins) are used to conduct procurement 
transactions. The proposed hypotheses are tested using an experimental approach. The experimental design, 
tasks and procedures for data collection are described in the following sections. 
4.1 Experimental design 
This study is based on laboratory and online experiments designed to test the research hypotheses. 
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Laboratory experiments are considered to be appropriate for establishing and testing causal relationships 
by manipulating the independent variables, controlling the environment and the procedure, and observing 
the effects on the dependent variables (Croson 2005; Kagel and Levin 2012). Online experiments have been 
widely conducted in e-commerce research because they replicate the natural environment and increase the 
external validity (Kerlinger and Lee 2000; Bapna, Jank et al. 2008). In this study, the experimental design 
with two mechanisms in both laboratory and online settings is used; it is shown in Table 2.  
 
[Table 2. Experimental design and treatments] 
 
In Experiment 1, the auctions and the negotiations were conducted in the laboratory environment 
in several sessions. Each session lasted two and a half hours, including preparation time and answering 
questionnaires. The buyers in negotiations and the suppliers were set up in different lab rooms, where the 
facilitators gave instructions and guided them through the experiment. The time slot for bidding and 
negotiating was also controlled and lasted 50 minutes. The auctions were in a multi-round setting; each 
round took five minutes. The bidders instantly obtained the auction updates on the rounds and the revealed 
information. The buyers and the suppliers in negotiations were exchanging offers and/or messages using 
the system; and, the system automatically posted a notice informing them about any change in their 
negotiation status. 
In Experiment 2, the auctions and the negotiations were running online and lasted 10 days. In 
auctions, each round was set as one day and thus auctions could last ten rounds at most. The participants 
could log on and off at any time during the auction or negotiation. They were informed by emails about any 
updates from the ongoing auctions and negotiations, and they were required to log on to access the updates 
and make offers or bids.  
4.2 Experimental tasks 
In order to compare auction and negotiation mechanisms, a business case was developed to simulate 
a “leverage” type of procurement transaction. The case involved securing a one-year contract between a 
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milk producer and several transportation service providers. Three attributes of the transportation service 
were given: (1) standard rate; (2) rush rate; and (3) penalty for delay. There was a number of values for 
each attribute, and the possible ranges were known to each participant. This generated 3,375 alternatives 
for the contract, which provided a relatively complex task. The transaction is important for both the milk 
producer and the transportation service providers. Given the number of alternatives and the shortlisted 
service providers, it is suitable for both auction and negotiation mechanisms. 
The buyers in negotiations represented a procurement officer for the milk producer.  The suppliers 
played the role of a sales manager for one of the service providers. They were competing with each other 
to win the contract. Each contract could be awarded to only one supplier. In auctions, the one who made 
the best bid for the milk producer would be the winner. In negotiations, the suppliers were negotiating with 
the buyer in order to reach an agreement. The suppliers wanted to get the contract that would bring profits 
rather than losses. The participants were given the break-even points of the contract for their company. 
The context and background provided in the general information document were known to every 
supplier, while the preferences were explained in the confidential information document that was not known 
to the other suppliers. The reservation and aspiration levels of each company were also indicated in their 
confidential information, indicating the worst and best deals respectively. A financial calculator 
implemented in the system and could be used by the participants to calculate the revenue and profit for each 
contract alternative. Based on the preferences of the buyer and each supplier, the utility distribution of 
alternatives could be identified and used for calculating the outcomes. 
4.3 Experimental procedures 
The experiments involved several steps. Before the experiment, the participants signed up online 
and their demographical information was gathered via a registration form. The participants were then 
randomly assigned different roles and one of the treatments. The participants were also required to watch a 
video demonstration of the system. This requirement followed a suggestion made by the participants’ in an 
earlier study (Wu and Kersten 2013). It ensured that the participants had the same basic knowledge and 
experience with the system in order to test the effects due to treated conditions (Jiang and Benbasat 2007). 
16 
The participants first read the general and confidential information in order to prepare themselves 
for the experiment. This was followed by a quiz and pre-questionnaire. The quiz was used to improve the 
participants’ understanding of the tasks. The participants were then asked to provide their perceptions of 
the task as well as their expected aspiration and reservation levels (Table B-1 in Appendix B). These 
measures were used to examine their understanding of the task and their expectations of the contract.  
The participants could access and review the general and confidential information any time during 
the transaction process. In the interaction phase, the participants constructed and submitted bids or offers 
on behalf of the companies they represented. In negotiations, they could send messages with or without 
offers. Once the transaction was closed, they were asked to fill out a post-experiment questionnaire to give 
their perceptions and evaluation of the process, the outcomes and the system (Table B-2 in Appendix B). 
The participants’ activities during the transaction process were recorded in a database, which was 
used to analyze the transaction process and outcomes. 
 
5. Data analysis and results 
The data sample and a descriptive analysis of the experiments are discussed in this section. Then, 
the hypotheses are tested, followed by group comparisons to further examine the differences between the 
two mechanisms.  
5.1 Data sample and descriptive analysis 
The experiments involved over five hundred business students from North America, Europe and 
Eastern Asia. The majority of suppliers were undergraduate students who were studying business courses 
related to information technologies; graduate students in business programs played the role of buyers in the 
negotiations (in auctions the buyers were replaced by the mechanism). The experiments were part of their 
course work and worth more than six percent of the total mark, including participation and performance.  
In the two experiments, 257 students registered for auctions and 262 registered for negotiations. 
The latter were matched with 67 buyers. After review and validation of the transactions, 82 records in the 
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supplier dataset were removed from the auction dataset and 64 from the negotiation dataset. The criteria for 
dropping those records were: (1) participant made only one bid/offer or did not make any bid/offer, and (2) 
there was only one participant (i.e., supplier) in the transaction. Consequently, the data records with 373 
suppliers and 61 buyers were used in the subsequent analysis: Experiment 1 includes 28 auctions and 23 
negotiations with the total of 181 suppliers; Experiment 2 includes 17 auctions and 38 negotiations with the 
total of 202 suppliers. 
Most of the participants were between 20 and 25 years old. About 48 to 57 percent of the 
participants were female; gender does not significantly differ across the treatments. Most of the participants 
perceived their knowledge about auctions or negotiations to be lower than average, and majority of the 
participants had low or no prior experience using an auction or negotiation system for e-procurement 
transactions. They also perceived the task to be relatively difficult. An ANOVA test showed no significant 
difference in their experience and the perceived task complexity between the treatments. 
5.2 Instrument testing and factor analysis 
The instrument developed in an earlier study on auctions (Wu and Kersten 2013) was adapted for 
both auctions and negotiations in this study. Participants’ responses to the post-experiment questionnaire 
were used to examine their assessment of the process, the outcomes and the system.  
Considering the differences between auctions and negotiations, the instrument was validated with 
a CFA for negations. Due to the small sample size of the negotiation dataset in Experiment 1 (N=60), the 
dataset in Experiment 2 was first used for the CFA (N=102) and followed by a group analysis with the two 
samples.  
A robust analysis was conducted—not limited by normality and sample size. The factor model 
provided a good fit for the data. The result of chi-square test statistic is χ2=37.42 with acceptable 
significance (p=0.04). The Bollen’s IFI is 0.97 which indicates a valid model independent from the sample 
size (Bollen 1990). Both CFI and NNFI are above 0.95 and RMSEA is located between zero and one 
(CFI=0.98; NNFI = 0.97; RMSEA=0.06), indicating a good fit of the factor model (Hu and Bentler 1999). 
The results confirm that the three types of suppliers’ assessment exist in the negotiations.  
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In terms of reliability, the values of Cronbach’s α for all factors are above the recommended criteria 
with a cut-off of 0.70 (AP=0.81, AO=0.90, AS=0.86), indicating high internal consistency (Nunnally and 
Berstein 1994). Moreover, the factor loadings are in an acceptable range (from 0.77 to 0.93), indicating a 
good convergent validity. The average variance extracted (AVE) has been recommended to indicate 
reliability and discriminant validity (Fornell and Larcker 1981). The AVEs for the three factors are all 
greater than 0.72, which satisfies the reliability criteria (AVE>0.50) and indicates adequate discriminant 
validity (the highest shared variance with 0.70 between AP and AS).  
The model was further validated by a group analysis of two samples: one with online negotiations 
(N=102) and one with both laboratory and online negotiations (N=162). The results show no differences in 
two factors: assessment of the outcomes and assessment of the system. However, the AVE for assessment 
of the process was lower in the combined sample (0.64), which is acceptable for reliability but fails to 
discriminate the assessment of the system. This again may be due to the high correlation between the two 
factors (0.84). It indicates that when the suppliers evaluate certain aspects of the negotiations they may also 
consider other aspects. In particular, the suppliers who are satisfied with the process are most likely also 
satisfied with the system, which may be due to the fact that the mechanisms that control the processes are 
implemented in the systems. A weighted sum for each factor was calculated using the factor loadings, and 
then used to compare suppliers’ assessment in subsequent data analysis. 
5.3 Hypotheses testing 
The hypotheses were tested with the datasets from the two experiments. Prior studies indicated that 
utility based variables such as concessions and outcomes may not necessarily conform to a normal 
distribution, thus nonparametric analysis such as Mann-Whitney U-test with independent samples has been 
suggested (Koppius and Heck 2003; Lösch and Lambert 2007). In this study, ANOVA tests were used to 
compare the mean values of the number of bids/offers, the convergence speed and the assessment, which 
confirmed normal distribution from the descriptive analysis. Mann-Whitney U-tests were used to compare 
the distribution of concessions and the outcome variables with independent samples from each treatment. 
Table 3 shows the results that compare the process, the outcomes and the suppliers’ assessment. 
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[Table 3. Comparison on the process, the outcomes and the assessment] 
 
Effects on process 
In Experiment 1 (laboratory setting), the suppliers made a significantly greater number of bids in 
auctions than offers in negotiations (6.61 vs. 3.57, p<0.01). They also made significantly larger concessions 
in auctions than in negotiations (60.89 vs. 23.08). In Experiment 2 (online setting), the differences remained 
but were not as significant as in Experiment 1 (4.72 vs. 3.40, p<0.05). Thus, hypotheses H1 and H2 are 
supported in both laboratory and online settings. 
The results show that the suppliers were more active in auctions, which might be due to the revealed 
public information that provided clearer directions and the same decision space for their bidding. Such 
information may also have increased competition between the bidders that motivated them to bid. In 
negotiations, each buyer was bargaining with two or more suppliers. Taking into account the average 
number of offers made by each supplier (3.57 in laboratory and 3.40 online), the buyer may have needed to 
review, evaluate and compare more than seven offers and then make decisions to reject offers or make 
counter-offers. Thus, the task load may have been shifted from the system to the buyers, which may have 
decreased the process efficiency in requesting new proposals. 
The convergence speed was not significantly different in the two mechanisms, neither in 
Experiment 1 nor in Experiment 2. Thus, hypothesis H3 is not supported. This may be due to the fact that 
the auction was multi-round with a fixed round duration (five minutes in Experiment 1 and one day in 
Experiment 2), which may have led to slow convergence if the suppliers submitted more bids and stayed in 
more rounds. In negotiations, the information exchange was two-way, meaning that both sides could make 
offers with certain concessions and thus could reach agreement in a shorter period. This together may have 
undermined the difference in the convergence speed between the two mechanisms. 
Effects on outcomes 
In terms of the outcomes, the buyers in Experiment 1 gained much higher profit in auctions than in 
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negotiations (75.82 vs. 47.13), while the suppliers reached better deals in negotiations than in auctions 
(23.39 vs. -7.82). The same happened in Experiment 2, though the differences were smaller (Table 3). Thus, 
hypotheses H4 and H5 are both fully supported in the two experiments. 
This may be due to the differences in concession-making between auctions and negotiations. In 
auctions, the suppliers had to continuously make concessions to compete against others, which increased 
the buyer’s gains but decreased their own profit. In fact, the suppliers were overbidding in the laboratory 
setting because of the highly competitive environment and time pressure. As a result, they won the contract, 
which, however, would not produce profit. In negotiations, the buyer made concessions with reciprocal 
offers from which the suppliers gained higher profit.  
The allocative efficiency was significantly higher in negotiations than in auctions, whereas the 
Pareto optimality was higher in auctions. In both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, the buyer and the 
suppliers in negotiations reached an agreement that was closer to the best achievable contract (i.e. the 
contract that maximizes the sum of utilities for both sides). This was not expected; it was assumed that 
auctions would result in higher competition between the suppliers and thus lead to more efficient contracts. 
Nonetheless, the suppliers were making large concessions and even overbidding in order to win the contract, 
which did not produce profit and made the process inefficient. In negotiations, even though the buyers made 
concessions that reduced their profit, the gains for both the buyer and the supplier ultimately increased the 
value of the contract and thus led to more efficient allocations. 
Note that an efficient contract may not be Pareto optimal, i.e. there may be alternatives that can 
improve the deal to increase the profit for the buyer, for the supplier or for both sides without decreasing 
the value for any side. In the two experiments, auctions led to better solutions or contracts than negotiations 
in terms of Pareto optimality (i.e. the solutions from auctions were closer to the efficient frontier). This was 
mainly due to the fact that the suppliers had to submit admissible bids in auctions and often had to make 
larger concessions to win the round. The concessions merely from the supplier side would lead to contracts 
that favor only the buyer, leaving little room for improvement for both parties. Thus, hypothesis H6 is 
partially supported in terms of Pareto optimality. 
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In terms of joint gains and outcome equity, the results also show a higher contract quality for both 
the buyer and the supplier in negotiations than in auctions. In Experiment 1, the joint gains were positive 
and larger in negotiations than in auctions (916.57 vs. -763.50). The negative value in auctions was caused 
by the suppliers’ overbidding and thus reaching non-profitable contracts. The joint gains in Experiment 2 
were improved for the contracts achieved through auctions but still worse than the ones achieved through 
negotiations. The outcome equity was significantly better in negotiations than in auctions in Experiment 1 
(0.68 vs. -0.06). The buyer and the supplier in negotiations were able to achieve more balanced contracts, 
which may be due to the concessions from both sides. In auctions, the suppliers were provided with 
admissible bids that may have lacked directions towards better solutions for both the buyer and the supplier. 
Also, the winning bids might have led the suppliers to compete with extreme values on certain attributes 
and thus led to more imbalanced contracts. The situation was improved in Experiment 2, where the 
difference between auctions and negotiations in terms of outcome equity was not significant. Thus, 
hypothesis H7 is fully supported in the laboratory setting (i.e. both joint gains and outcome equity), while 
it is partially supported in the online setting (only joint gains). 
Effects on suppliers’ assessment 
In comparing their assessment, the suppliers who used the negotiation mechanism in Experiment 1 
were more satisfied with the process and the outcomes than the suppliers who used the auction mechanism 
(Table 3). The suppliers did not significantly differ in the system assessment. In Experiment 2, there were 
no significant differences in the suppliers’ assessment of the process, the outcomes and the system. Thus, 
hypothesis H8 is partially supported in the laboratory setting and not supported in the online setting.  
It was expected that the suppliers would evaluate the systems differently since they reported 
different feelings about the process and the outcomes. It is possible that suppliers did not "blame" the system 
because of their outcomes. The results show that the systems were neither considered very good nor very 
bad. This suggests that there was no difference in their perception of the systems (e.g. user interface, 
features), which confirms that the systems used in these experiments did not generate confounding effect 
on the results. However, it is also possible that the suppliers provided positive or negative assessments 
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solely based on their own outcomes, which may have undermined the differences in system evaluation.  
5.4 Comparisons  
The analysis and the results of hypotheses testing also indicate potential impacts from: (1) the 
experimental setting (laboratory vs. online), and (2) the outcomes (winners vs. non-winners of the contract). 
Thus, further analyses were conducted to examine these effects. 
Comparison 1: laboratory setting vs. online setting 
The results of experimental setting comparison are also shown in Table 3. They show that the 
bidders made significantly more bids and greater concessions in the laboratory than online experiments (T1 
vs. T3). In terms of the number of offers and total concession, the suppliers in negotiations did not behave 
differently in the two settings (T2 vs. T4). The transactions were converged significantly faster in the 
laboratory than in online settings for both auctions and negotiations (p<0.01). On average, it took two times 
longer when the transactions were conducted online.  
In terms of the outcomes, there was no significant difference in negotiations in the two settings (T2 
vs. T4). In auctions, the buyer’s profit was slightly more decreased in the online than in the laboratory 
setting (66.94 vs. 75.82, p<0.1), while the supplier’s profit was significantly improved when they worked 
online (3.94 vs. -7.82, p<0.05). On average, the suppliers were able to reach profitable contracts when they 
were given longer time for the round duration and for the total transaction length. They also achieved more 
efficient contracts with higher joint gains and outcome equity (p<0.05), though the Pareto optimality did 
not differ from the laboratory setting. 
It was also found that the suppliers in auctions reported a higher level of assessment of the process 
and the outcomes when they were bidding online. There were no significant differences in their assessment 
of the systems in the experiments, neither in auctions nor in negotiations. 
Overall, the results were consistent in the two experiments, whereas the effects of the mechanisms 
on the process, the outcomes and the assessment were weakened in the online setting. This was expected 
as stronger effects could be observed in a more controlled setting (i.e. laboratory experiment). It is also 
possible that the time pressure and competition level were higher in the laboratory setting, which caused 
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larger concessions from the suppliers in auctions and thus led to worse contracts for them. 
Comparison 2: winning suppliers vs. non-winning suppliers 
The winning suppliers were awarded the contract and they could have perceived themselves to be 
more successful than other suppliers (i.e. non-winners). Since the convergence speed and the outcome 
variables are measured at the transaction level (i.e. an agreement was reached between the buyer and the 
supplier), they are not applicable to those who did not reach a contract. Thus, the comparison was made 
of the suppliers’ behavior in the process and their assessment of the process, the outcomes and the system. 
The winning suppliers submitted greater number of bids/offers than the non-winning suppliers in 
three treatments: laboratory auction (8.50 vs. 5.41, p<0.01), online auction (5.35 vs. 4.04, p<0.05) and 
online negotiation (3.58 vs. 2.75, p<0.01). They also made larger concessions than the non-winners did in 
those three treatments. This indicates that the winners were more actively participating in the transaction 
and in the competition against other suppliers. 
Overall, the winners had significantly more positive assessment of the process, the outcomes and 
the system than the non-winners did (p<0.01). This suggests that it is the outcomes (i.e. winning or losing 
the contract) and not the concession-making that affects their assessment. In turn, this may indicate the low 
payout from making large concessions that result in loses. The only exception was their assessment of the 
process in the laboratory experiment, which might be due to the shorter time and faster convergence. The 
results indicate that the suppliers’ outcomes indeed affected their perception and evaluation of the 
transaction process, the outcomes and the systems. When they won the competition and were awarded the 
contract, they had more positive attitude towards their assessment. 
 
6. Discussion 
E-procurement has advanced with the adoption of information technologies and various 
mechanisms, leading to cost savings, strategic advantages and enhanced business relationships. Effective 
procurement depends not only on the proper selection of products and services but also on the appropriate 
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selection and use of mechanisms. Despite a number of general guidelines that have been formulated, there 
is lack of empirical evidence that can assist and suggest strategic choices of various mechanisms. 
Business procurement often involves multiple parties and multiple attributes, which requires 
advanced market mechanisms. Auctions and negotiations are traditionally two different classes of market 
mechanisms. With the advancement of information technologies, these two different mechanisms have 
recently been extended to facilitate and govern such procurement transactions as single-attribute auctions 
to multi-attribute auctions and bilateral negotiations to multi-bilateral negotiations. This study takes a 
further step to experimentally compare two mechanisms in e-procurement: multi-attribute reverse auctions 
and multi-attribute multi-bilateral negotiations. Their differences in the transaction process and outcomes 
and the suppliers’ assessment were investigated in laboratory and online experiments, wherein the same 
procurement transaction was conducted. Group comparisons were also conducted to further examine the 
effects of experimental setting, suppliers’ outcomes and buyer’s behavior.  
6.1 Findings and implications 
The results from the two experiments are consistent; however, there are some differences between 
the two mechanisms. The results show that auctions were more efficient and more competitive than 
negotiations in terms of the process, including the number of bids or offers and the concessions made by 
the suppliers. Also, auctions outperformed negotiations in terms of the buyer’s gains at the expense of the 
supplier’s profit. The contracts reached through auctions were more efficient than those through 
negotiations in terms of Pareto optimality. However, the buyers and the suppliers reached more balanced 
contracts in negotiations than in auctions. The suppliers gained more profit in negotiations than in auctions, 
and they also showed higher assessment of the process and the outcomes in negotiations. 
The differences between auctions and negotiations are more significant in the laboratory than in 
online setting. The results show significant differences mainly in auctions. In the laboratory setting, the 
suppliers made a greater number of bids and larger concessions, and thus achieved worse contracts and 
showed a lower level of assessment of the process and the outcomes.  
It was expected that the suppliers’ behavior and assessment would differ between the winners and 
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non-winners. Indeed, the results of a group comparison within each treatment show that the winning 
suppliers were more actively participating in the transactions and competing against others by making more 
bids/offers with larger concessions. The winners had significantly more positive assessment of the process, 
the outcomes and the system than the non-winners did. 
Several implications can be drawn from these findings. First, advanced auction and negotiation 
mechanisms can be used for the same e-procurement transactions, wherein the number of suppliers and the 
number of attributes are extended from the traditional bilateral negotiations and single-attribute auctions. 
This may also potentially increase the capability of such mechanisms when dealing with more complex 
supply market and thus become applicable to both “leverage” and “strategic” types of transactions (Kraljic 
1983; Handfield and Straight 2003; Gelderman and Van Weele 2005). Also, the two mechanisms 
demonstrated different effects even in conducting the same transactions. Organizations may use these 
mechanisms strategically in their procurement management. Auctions are more efficient and foster 
competition, which can benefit buyers in requesting and receiving proposals from different suppliers, 
increasing the bargaining power, and thus reaching a better deal. In a shorter period, higher competition and 
time pressure may lead to overbidding and non-profitable contracts for the suppliers. This may hurt their 
incentives to participate in such transactions. In a longer period, nonetheless, auctions can still be efficient 
and lead to profitable contracts for both buyers and suppliers. Negotiations can benefit both sides with 
profitable and more balanced contracts. This may be of particular concern when the buyer’s goal is not to 
maximize her profit but to improve social welfare (e.g. in public procurement) (Croom and Brandon-Jones 
2005; Subramanian 2009). 
Second, the buyer can make reciprocal offers with certain concessions in negotiations and thus lead 
to higher quality contracts. One distinction between auctions and negotiations is that while auctions focus 
on economic value (e.g. cost savings, profit gains), negotiations have both economic and social aspects. In 
auctions, the competition is among suppliers as they bid against each other. The concessions are made 
merely by the suppliers, thus actions favor the buyer. In negotiations, the competition between suppliers is 
brought about through the buyer’s involvement. It can be similar to auctions, if the buyer does not make 
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any concessions; however, the offers or counter-offers made by the buyer often require certain concessions 
and reciprocity that also benefit the suppliers (Kersten, Vahidov et al. 2013). Taking into account the 
counterpart’s interests in the transactions, the two sides may exchange reciprocal offers and thus reach a 
more balanced agreement. Mechanism designers and practitioners should note such differences in 
concession-making between auctions and negotiations. 
Moreover, the buyer’s different roles can be distinguished and analyzed with respect to the types 
of information conveyed to the suppliers. In auctions, the information about admissible bids and winning 
bids is announced to all the suppliers. The information may be implicit in disclosing the buyer’s preferences, 
but it provides sufficient guidance for the suppliers to make progressive bids. It may also lead to higher 
competition and thus more concessions by the suppliers as it indicates the existence of competitors. Note 
that the winning bids in auctions provide anchors for suppliers’ decision-making in their subsequent bids, 
which may also direct their attention to inappropriate alternatives. Suppliers should note and avoid such 
risks by carefully analyzing the information obtained from the buyer through the mechanisms. Buyers may 
consider other choices in providing feedback information to the bidders, for instance, bid ranking and 
average value (Adomavicius, Gupta et al. 2012). 
In negotiations, the information is private obtained through the communication between the buyer 
and each supplier separately. The information with message only is not verifiable; the suppliers may hesitate 
to make offers and concessions based merely on such information. The buyer’s offers and counter-offers 
are not only valid information but they are also reciprocal to the suppliers, which motivates them to make 
counter-offers with greater concessions. In order to motivate suppliers to submit their proposals, buyers 
may need to provide more public and verifiable information (e.g. outstanding offers) (Thomas and Wilson 
2005) and more clear guidance in directing the suppliers’ offers to trade-offs between different attributes. 
Thus, buyers should behave strategically to convey more influential information in different contexts. 
Lastly, user’s assessment has been well studied and widely used in assessing information systems 
and online transactions (Zviran and Erlich 2003). The results from this study confirm that assessment is a 
multi-facet instrument and can be used to assess e-procurement transaction looking at various aspects. E-
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procurement is a unique process that involves two sides and multiple parties. In such a collaborative 
environment, users’ assessment may be influenced by their counterparts and competitors. Procurement 
mechanisms define the rules that prescribe participants’ behavior and their interactions, which may affect 
their experience and thus assessment of the transactions. It is worth noticing that user’s assessment is 
strongly affected by their performance and outcomes in such transactions. Suppliers who are awarded the 
contracts through their efforts are more satisfied with the process, the outcomes and the systems. 
6.2 Limitations and future research 
Several limitations in this study should be noted. This study addresses multi-attribute transactions 
in e-procurement and thus allows exchange of only complete offers and awarding a contract to one supplier. 
In practice, it may be feasible and required to have partial offers, multi-sourcing and nested transactions. 
Future research may extend the present study to compare the variants of mechanisms in those situations. 
For instance, researchers may consider the relative importance and interdependency of the attributes, which 
can be used to transform the partial offers to single-attribute or similar multi-attribute transactions. 
This study compares auctions and negotiations in e-procurement, considering their differences in 
information exchange and buyers’ participation. In future research, experiments with different controllable 
information may validate and extend this comparison. For example, buyers in negotiations may only send 
messages without making any offers, may only make verifiable offers without messages (Thomas and 
Wilson 2005), or may share the outstanding offers from the suppliers. This will allow for more explicit 
control and examination of the buyer’s behavior in the process.  
The transaction task in the experiment is relatively complex and the number of participants in each 
transaction is small. This may limit the findings to those transactions that involve business contracts with 
only a few potential and important suppliers. The number of suppliers involved in the process may affect 
the outcomes (Thomas and Wilson 2002). A comparison of the impact of the number of suppliers on the 
auction and negotiation outcomes was not conducted because of the small sample size. Future work may 
replicate the experiments and control the number of suppliers in each transaction.  
Two experiments were carried out to enhance the internal and external validity of this study. The 
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participants were university students who study information systems in business programs. Advantages and 
disadvantages of this type of studies have been discussed widely in e-business literature(Jiang and Benbasat 
2007). Future research may validate the hypotheses and findings with a field study where business 
professionals use similar systems in real-life transactions.  
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Tables 
Table 1. Empirical studies comparing auctions and negotiations 







No difference in transaction price with 4 sellers; 
Auction outperforms negotiation with 2 sellers; 






Lower transaction prices in negotiations; 
No difference in efficiency. 




Auction outperforms negotiation in welfare maximization, 
fairness of welfare distribution, and effort. 
Gattiker et al. 
2007 
Auction,  
F2F negotiation,  
Email negotiation 
Seller’s trust decreased from F2F negotiation, to email 
negotiation and then to auction; 
In a task with greater complexity, seller’s trust decreased 
in auction, but increased in e-mail negotiation. 
Field studies 




Auctions may perform poorly with complex projects, 
incomplete contractual design and few available bidders; 
Negotiations have advantages when contracts are ill-
defined a priori, and they facilitate discussion and 





Auctions can and should be used when: items with high 
specificity and attractiveness, a large number of suppliers 
having a high degree of rivalry, and a higher level of trust 




Table 2. Experimental design and treatments 
Mechanisms Experiment 1  (Laboratory setting) 
Experiment 2 
(Online setting) 
Auction Treatment 1 (T1) Treatment 3 (T3) 







Table 3. Comparison of the process, the outcomes and the assessment 
  Experiment 1 Experiment 2 T1 T2 T3 T4 
Process 
No. of bids/offers 6.61*# 3.57 4.72^ 3.40 
Total concession 60.89*# 23.08 46.05* 25.91 
Convergence speed 21.97- 19.15+ 47.76 53.67 
Outcomes 
Buyer’s profit 75.82*- 47.13 66.94* 52.61 
Supplier’s profit -7.82*+ 23.39 3.94* 19.92 
Allocative efficiency 62.26*+ 30.94 50.71* 33.25 
Pareto optimality 0.50* 13.57 0.76* 11.58 
Joint gain -763.50*+ 916.57 -218.06* 935.74 
Outcome equity -0.06*+ 0.68 0.35 0.45 
Assessment 
Process 3.52*- 4.19 3.83 3.95 
Outcomes 2.93*# 3.73 3.68 3.39 
System 3.63 3.88 3.84 4.06 
 
Note: (1) numbers are mean values; (2) significance when comparing auction to negotiation 
(T1 vs. T2, T3 vs. T4): * p < 0.01, ^ p < 0.05; and, (3) significance when comparing 






Figure 1. Research model 
Note: “+”indicates a positive effect and “-”indicates a negative effect, when comparing 











o Number of bids/offers (+)
o Total concession (+)
o Convergence speed (+)
Outcomes
o Buyer’s profit (+)
o Supplier’s profit (-)
o Allocative efficiency (+)
o Pareto optimality (+)
o Joint gains (-)
o Outcome equity (-)
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Figure 2. Screen of “Bids & Limits” after several rounds in Imaras 
 




Appendix A: Measurement of process and outcomes 
Table A-1. Variables and measurement of process 
Variables Measures and scales Relevant studies 
Number of 
bids 
Individual level: The total number of bids submitted by 
each individual. 
Transaction level: The total number of bids submitted by 
all the participants in the same auction. (Scale: integer 
number greater or equal to 0) 
(Bichler 2000; Koppius 







Individual level: The total number of offers made by 
each individual. 
Transaction level: The total number of offers made by all 
the participants in the same negotiation. (Scale: integer 
number greater or equal to 0) 
(Kersten and Noronha 
1999; Vetschera et al. 
2006) 
Concessions The value change between bids or offers made by the 
same party. The value is the revenue of the proposed 
contract with a rating scale of 0–100. The suppliers’ total 
concession is the value change between their first 
bid/offer and their final bid/offer. This indicates how 
much value the suppliers have compromised through the 
transaction.  (Scale: integer number between 0 and 100) 
(Nastase 2006; Vetschera 
2007; Johnson and 
Cooper 2009; 
Wachowicz and Wu 
2010; Whitford et al. 





The amount of time to close the transaction with or 
without an agreement (i.e., actual interaction time) 
divided by the announced time length. It indicates how 
fast a transaction converged or reached a result. (Scale: 
percentage between 0 and 100%) 
(Koppius et al. 2000; 




Table A-2. Variables and measurement of outcomes 
Variables Descriptions and scales Relevant studies 
Buyer’s 
profit 
The difference between the buyer’s revenue of the contract and 
her break-even point. (Scale: integer number between -100 and 
100) 
(Bichler 2000; 
Koppius and Heck 
2003; Chen-Ritzo 




The difference between the winning supplier’s revenue of the 




The deviation of the achieved contract from the Nash solution (i.e. 
alternative which maximizes the product value of the buyers’ and 
winning supplier’s profits). It is calculated with the Euclidean 
distance between the product value of an achieved contract and 
the Nash solution. It indicates the distance from the contract to the 
best possible deal in the utility space. The smaller the value, the 
more efficient the contract. (Scale: real number between 0 and 
100) 
(Koppius, Kumar 
et al. 2000; 




The number of alternatives that dominate the achieved contract to 
the Pareto frontier (i.e., number of solutions that are even better 
for both the buyer and supplier, comparing to the contract they 
reached). It indicates the possible decision space that the buyer 
and supplier may explore or improve to gain more value for both. 
The smaller the value, the higher efficient the contract and the 
smaller room for contract improvement. (Scale: integer number 
between 0 and 3375) 
(Koppius, Kumar 
et al. 2000; 
Koppius and Heck 
2003) 
Joint gains The product of the buyer’s profit and the winning supplier’s profit 
based on the contract, which indicates the social welfare for both 
sides from the achieved contract. The larger the value, the greater 
the social welfare for both the buyer and supplier. (Scale: integer 
number between -10000 and 10000) 
(Weingart et al. 
1993; Foroughi et 
al. 1995; Gerke 




The division of the winner’s profit over the buyer’s profit based 
on the contract, which indicates the contract balance between the 
two sides. The closer the value to one, the higher equity the 
contract. (Scale: real number between -100 and 100) 
(Croson 1999; 
Foroughi et al. 
2001; Gerke and 
Stiller 2006; 





Appendix B: Questionnaires 
Table B-1. Pre-experiment questionnaire  




Understanding of the case I just read was ...  
Based on the case description, I expect the contracting task to be ... 
(7-point Liker scale, “Very difficult” to “Very easy”) 
(Gattiker et al. 





After reading the case, what agreement/contract do you think you 
will reach? 
(list of values for each attribute) 
Reservation 
levels 
What is the worst offer that you think you may still accept? 
(list of values for each attribute) 
 
Table B-2. Post-experiment questionnaire  






It was easy to keep track of the process. 
The organization of process in phases and steps was useful. 
This process was stimulating. 
(7-point Liker scale from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly 
agree”) 
(Curhan et al. 







I am satisfied with the results that I achieved.  
I am satisfied with the results as compared to my expectations.  
I think I obtained the best results for the company that I 
represent. 
(7-point Liker scale from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly 
agree”) 
(Suh 1999; Curhan 
et al. 2006; 







The system was helpful in achieving my objectives. 
The system was helpful in improving my performance. 
The system was helpful in managing the process. 
(7-point Liker scale from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly 
agree”) 
(Vetschera et al. 
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